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Abstract 
In this  paper  we estimate price effects of trading on the Paris  Bourse.  We use several 
methods  to decompose price effects into transitory  and  permanent  parts.  First, we use the 
Glosten  (1994)  model  for  an  electronic  order-driven  market.  In  line  with  theoretical 
predictions,  the price impact increases  with trade size, and  is estimated between 25%  (for 
small  transactions)  and  60%  (for  large  transactions)  of the  total  spread.  We  then  use  a 
reduced  form  approach  based  on  a  multi-period  Vector  Auto  Regression.  The  VAR 
estimates of the permanent  price impact are between 40%  and  115%  of the spread,  much 
larger than the estimates of Glosten's one-period model. We check the robustness of these 
results by less restrictive, direct estimates of long-run price effects and confirm the results 
of the VAR analysis.  We separately analyze the price effects of off-exchange transactions. 
These appear to have no long run price impact at all. In all results, there is no reversal of 
the direction of trade,  which suggests that inventory control is unlikely to be important on 
the Paris Bourse. 
JEL classification:  G14; C32 
Keywords:  Microstructure;  Asymmetric information;  VAR; Persistence;  Robustness 
1. Introduction 
There  is  by  now  a  large  literature  that  analyzes  transactions  data  for financial 
markets.  Among  the  issues  in  this  literature  are  the  dynamic  properties  of 
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transaction prices, and  in  particular the price effect of trading.  Closely related to 
this work is the issue of estimating the components of the bid-ask spread. Much of 
the empirical literature in this area is based on theoretical models, although more 
reduced form approaches are also popular.  In this paper, we analyze price effects 
of trading  and  the  components of the  bid-ask spread on a  new data set from the 
Paris Bourse. The Bourse operates a fully automated order processing system (the 
CAC system) based on an electronic  limit order book. This trading  system gives 
very high quality limit order and transactions data. 
We take several different approaches to estimating price effects of trading. The 
two main models that we use are the Glosten (1994) model and the VAR model 
pioneered in market microstructure work by Hasbrouck, 1991a, Hasbrouck, 1991b, 
Hasbrouck,  1993.  The  former model  is  closely  linked  to  market microstructure 
theory,  whereas  the  latter  adopts  a  more  agnostic,  reduced  form approach.  We 
show that these models yield different price effect estimates. Moreover, we show 
that there is an important difference between the effects of trading on mid-quotes 
and on transaction prices. 
Our  paper  is,  to  our  knowledge,  the  first  that  empirically  implements  the 
Glosten  (1994)  model  of liquidity  provision  via a  public  limit order book.  Here 
each  order  that  is  initiated  by  an  impatient  trader  can  effectively  be  executed 
against a  series of limit orders at different prices.  We extend Glosten's model to 
incorporate the possibility that limit order providers may require compensation for 
order processing cost and/or oligopoly rents. We derive an explicit decomposition 
of bid-ask spreads faced by impatient traders into adverse selection and other costs 
incurred  by the providers of liquidity. 
A  further methodological innovation in this paper is a test of the robustness of 
the VAR approach. We propose a direct estimate of expected price changes due to 
a transaction, and compare these estimates to the price effects implied by the VAR 
model.  We show that most conclusions of the  VAR model stand  up against this 
test.  The robust  approach also  allows  us  to  analyze the  price  effects of off-ex- 
change transactions separately. 
The  paper is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  discuss  the  institutional 
structure of the Bourse and the data.  In Section 3 we analyze the price effects of 
trading  using  structural  models  of transaction  prices.  In  Section  4  we  apply the 
reduced  form methodology developed  by  Hasbrouck,  1991a,  Hasbrouck,  1991b, 
Hasbrouck, 1993  to estimate the price effects of trading. In Section 5 we check the 
robustness of the results.  In Section 6  we conclude. 
2.  Institutional background and data 
In this section we briefly describe the trading structure on the Paris Bourse and 
the  data.  The  Bourse  is  a  continuous  auction  market  that  uses  a  centralized 
electronic  system for displaying and  processing orders,  the  Cotation Assist6e  en F.d. Jong et al. /  Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996) 193-213  195 
Continu  (CAC)  system.  This  system,  based  on  the  Toronto  Stock  Exchange's 
CATS  (Computer  Assisted Trading  System),  was  first  implemented  in  Paris  in 
1986.  Since  then,  trading  in  nearly  all  securities  has  been  transferred  from  the 
floor of the exchange  onto the  CAC  system. All the most actively traded French 
equities are traded on  a  monthly settlement basis in round lots of 5  to  100  shares 
set  by  the  Soci&6  des  Bourses  Fran~aises  (SBF) to  reflect their  unit  price.  The 
SBF  itself acts  as  a  clearing  house  for buyers  and  sellers,  providing guarantees 
against  counterparty  default.  There  are  no  specialists  or  professional  market 
makers. Instead, liquidity is provided by the public limit order book. 
Every morning at  10 a.m. the trading day opens with a  batch auction where all 
eligible orders are filled at a  common market clearing price. Nowadays the batch 
auction  is  relatively  unimportant,  accounting  for  no  more  than  10  to  15%  of 
trading  volume.  Its  role  is  to  establish  an  equilibrium  price  before  continuous 
trading starts. Continuous trading takes place from  10 a.m. to 5  p.m. 
In the continuous trading session there  are two types of orders possible, limit 
orders and market orders. Limit orders specify the quantity to be bought or sold, a 
required price and a  date for automatic withdrawal if not executed by then, unless 
the  limit  order  is  good  till  cancelled ("h  rrvocation").  Limit  orders  cannot  be 
issued at  arbitrary prices because there  is a  minimum  "tick"  size of FF 0.1  for 
stock prices below FF 500,  and FF 1 for higher prices. More than one limit order 
may  be  issued at the  same  price.  Strict time priority applies in  the execution of 
such orders. 
Market orders only specify the quantity to be traded and are executed immedi- 
ately  "au prix du marchr",  i.e., at the best price available. If the total quantity of 
the limit orders at this best price do not suffice to fill the whole market order, the 
remaining  part  of  the  market  order  is  transformed  into  a  limit  order  at  the 
transaction price (for a  detailed description of this system see Biais et al.,  1995). 
Hence,  market orders do not automatically walk up the limit order book,  and do 
not always provide immediate execution of the whole order. 1 
After the  opening,  traders  linked up  to the  CAC  system  will  see an  onscreen 
display of the  "market by price".  For both the bid side and  the  ask side of the 
market, the five best limit order prices are displayed together with the quantity of 
shares  available at that price and  the  number  of individual orders involved. The 
difference  between  the  best  bid  and  ask  price  is  known  as  the  "fourchette". 
Brokers  can  scroll  down  to  further  pages  of  the  screen  to  view  limit  orders 
available beyond the five best prices. In addition, some information concerning the 
i A trader who wants to trade a certain quantity immediately can circumvent this mechanism by 
placing a limit order at a price that is very unfavorable to him. This limit order will then be executed 
against existing orders on the other side of the market that show a more favorable price. In the data, 
these show up as a series of transactions on the same side of the market with the same time stamp. 196  F.d. Jong et al./ Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996)  193-213 
recent  history  of  trading  is  given:  time,  price,  quantity  and  buyer  and  seller 
identification codes for the five last transactions, the cumulative quantity and value 
of all transactions since the opening, and the price change from the previous day's 
close to the latest transaction. 
The  member  firms  of  the  Bourse  (the  "Socirtrs  de  Bourse")  key  orders 
directly  into  the  CAC  system  via  a  local  terminal.  All  market  participants  can 
contribute to liquidity by putting limit orders on display. There is some scope for 
negotiated  deals  if  the  limit  order  book  is  insufficiently  deep.  A  financial 
intermediary can negotiate a deal directly with a client at a price lying within the 
current  fourchette,  provided  that  the  deal  is  immediately  reported  to  the  CAC 
system as a  "cross order". For trades at prices outside the fourchette, the member 
firm acting as a principal is obliged to fill all central market limit orders displaying 
a better price than the negotiated price within five minutes. 
Our data set is  a transcription of all  changes in the trading screen information 
for all  shares  on  the  CAC  system  for 44  trading  days  in  the  summer  of  1991, 
starting May 25 and ending July 25. We have a complete record of the total limit 
order quantity at the five best prices on both the bid side and the ask side of the 
market  and  all  transactions.  Due  to  the  automated  trading  system,  the  data  are 
relatively clean.  The time  stamps  indicate  exactly the  time  of the  transaction  or 
quote change. Also, quote and trade information is in correct sequence, so that it is 
possible  to  find  out  exactly  who  initiated  the  trade,  the  buyer or  the  seller,  by 
comparing the  transaction price with the previous mid-quote, i.e.,  the average of 
best buy and sell  limit order prices. 
Concerning transactions, there  is an  indicator showing whether the transaction 
is a  "cross" negotiated outside the CAC system. We also have broker identifica- 
tion codes for the buying and selling parties,  which allow us to identify series of 
small  transactions  that  were  initiated  by  the  same  person  as  part  of one  large 
transaction. The transaction price per share for such transactions is defined as the 
quantity weighted average of the price of the small transactions that together make 
up the larger one. 
In this paper,  we use a  sample of transactions in the shares of ten large firms, 
with  4000  to  11,000  observations  per  stock.  Most  transactions  involve  a  limit 
order, so that it can be determined exactly who initiated the trade,  the buyer or the 
seller.  For the  "crosses", which are  negotiated outside the CAC system, we use 
the simple rule that transactions with a price above the mid-quote 2 are deemed to 
be buyer initiated, and below the mid-quote seller initiated. Transactions exactly at 
the mid-quote are  not classified.  The size of the transaction is  normalized to the 
number  of shares  traded  divided  by  the  so-called  Normal  Market  Size  (NMS), 
which is a transaction size set by the  authorities on London's SEAQ International 
market, and roughly corresponds to the median transaction size in  that stock. For 
2 The mid-quote is defined as the average between the best bid and the best ask price available. F.d Jon g et al. /  Journal of Empirical Finance  3 (1996)  193-213  197 
the Paris market,  1 NMS corresponds to the 99th percentile of the transaction size 
distribution,  see De Jong et al.  (1995). 
French  shares  are  also traded  on other exchanges,  especially  London's SEAQ 
International.  It  would  appear  natural  to  analyze  transactions  data  from  both 
markets  simultaneously.  There  are  good reasons  not to include  London data  into 
the analysis, however. Transactions  in London are negotiated between  traders and 
market makers by telephone and are not made public,  so that other traders cannot 
see that they have taken place. The trading process in London is not very visible to 
outsiders;  only the  market  makers'  quotes  are  publicly  observable,  but  these  are 
often  adjusted  slowly  and  do  not  give  a  good  indication  of actual  transaction 
prices.  Therefore,  we  decided  to  analyze  only  the  transactions  from  the  Paris 
Bourse. 
3.  Estimating price effects  by a  structural market microstructure model 
As described before, the CAC system operating on the Paris Bourse is close to 
an  ideal  electronic  open  limit  order  book  system.  Glosten  (1994)  presents  a 
theoretical model of prices and price revisions due to trading in such a market.  In 
this  section,  we develop an empirical implementation  of Glosten's model and we 
estimate  this model on the data from the Paris Bourse. 
Our  starting  point  is  the  original  Glosten  (1994)  model  where  there  are  no 
explicit  order processing costs.  To simplify the exposition  we discuss only buyer 
initiated  transactions.  As  in  Glosten  (1994),  let  R(q),  the  "revenue"  function, 
denote the total payment made  for his order by a  buyer who initiates  an order of 
size  q, over and above the ex ante expected value of his order (that is the quantity 
q  times  y, the best public estimate of the stock before it is known that the order is 
forthcoming). The marginal  price of a  transaction  of size  q  is determined by the 
following rule: 
R'(q)  = Ez[e(z)  ] z >-- q],  (1) 
where  e(z) is the revision of the best public estimate  of the security's value when 
it becomes known that a buyer-initiated order has arrived on the market, and that it 
is  of size  z.  E z denotes  the expectation  taken  with respect to the transaction  size 
distribution.  We assume that this distribution  is exponential,  so that 
--q 
Fz(q) =  1 -  e  ~  (2) 
The  price  revision  describes  the  change  in  expectations  of the  true  value  of the 
stock due to a transaction of size q. For simplicity, we assume that this schedule is 
linear: 
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Under these assumptions the marginal price schedule is 
R'( q)  =  e o +  elEz[ zl z  >  q]  =  e o +  et( q  +  et),  (4) 
where  the  latter  equality  follows  from the properties  of the exponential  distribu- 
tion.  As an  extension  of Glosten's  model,  we introduce an  order processing cost 
component  in  the  marginal  revenue  schedule  (Glosten,  1994).  Let  the  order 
processing cost function be denoted by  C(q),  then 
R'( q)  =  C'( q)  +  e o +  el( q  +  et).  (5) 
Our data do not concern marginal  prices but rather average prices.  Integrating (5) 
and dividing by q  one obtains the average price schedule: 
R(q)  C(q)  1 
--  =  --  +  (e 0  +  elo~ )  -Jr" -~ejq.  (6) 
q  q 
For  simplicity,  we  assume  that  the  average  order  processing  cost  is  a  linear 
function of q. 3 Hence, 
R(q)  1 
=  c o +  c,q +  (e o +  elot )  +  ~e,q  =- R o +  Rlq,  (7) 
q 
where  R o=c o+e 0+eJct  and  R~=c~+l/2e  1.  In  summary,  in  the  Glosten 
model we have the following decomposition of the bid-ask spread: 
1 
Adverse selection cost:( e 0 +  ejct)  +  ~elq 
Order processing cost:c  o +  c~ q 
For  the  empirical  implementation  of  this  model  we  introduce  the  following 
notation: 
logarithm of the transaction  price (average price paid per share), 
quantity (number of shares  traded), 
"sign"  of the transaction, 4 
expected value of the stock  before  the transaction, 






where  the  time  index  counts  transactions  (i.e.,  the  model  will  be  specified  in 
transaction  time).  The  first  equation  of  the  empirical  model  states  that  the 
transaction price is equal to the expected value of the stock before the transaction, 
plus the average price premium,  R(q)/q,  given by Eq. (7).  As in Madhavan et al. 
(1994)  we  add  a  random  pricing  error,  u t,  that  captures  other influences  on  the 
3 Note that this implies a quadratic cost function with zero intercept. 
4 The sign is defined as  + 1 if the transaction is initiated by the buyer (at the ask) and  -  1 if the 
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transaction price, such as price discreteness and other factors that are not modeled. 
We assume that  u,  is  uncorrelated with the other variables in  the price equation. 
Thus, the pricing equation becomes 
Pt =Yt +  ( Ro + Rlqt)Qt + ut"  (8) 
The  price  revision  can  be  modeled  by the  change  in  the  expected  value  Yt,  as 
follows: 
y,+ , = yt +  ( eo + e,qt)Qt +  ~.t+,,  (9) 
where  %+~  is publicly observed information that comes in between  transaction  t 
and  t +  1,  but is  unrelated to the current transaction.  Substitution of (8) into (9) 
yields the following equation for observed transaction price changes 
A pt+ l =  A( R o + R, qt+ l)Qt+ , +  ( e o +  elqt)Qt +  et+ l,  (10) 
where  e t =  ~t +  Aut"  The  interpretation of this equation is simple: the coefficients 
of the  "difference"  variables  are  the  intercept  and  slope  of the  average  price, 
whereas  the  coefficients  of the  levels  one  period  lagged  are  estimates  of  the 
intercept and slope of the price revision schedule. 
The equation to be estimated is found by rewriting (10) slightly: 
Apt+l  =cWgoAat+l  +glA(qt+lQt+l)  +eoat+elqtQt+et+l.  (11) 
A number of econometric issues concerning the estimation of this equation require 
special attention. Following Harris (1986) and Hasbrouck (1991 b),  who argue that 
observed  covariance  patterns  in  transaction  returns  are  more  consistent  with 
transaction time than with calendar time,  we assume that the relevant  "clock" is 
transaction  time.  We  include  a  constant  term,  c,  in  the  model  to  capture  the 
average return between transactions (i.e.,  a non-zero mean of et). The variance of 
the  errors  is  unspecified  by the  model.  For several  reasons,  it  is  likely  that  the 
errors  are heteroskedastic.  For example,  the  variance may depend on the time  of 
day, and the  variance may depend on the trade size.  If the pricing equation (Eq. 
(8)) is not exact, the regression error has an MA(1) serial  correlation pattern. With 
this  error structure,  OLS gives consistent point estimates,  but the  usual  standard 
error  formula  is  incorrect.  We  compute  heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) standard errors by the method of Newey and West (1987).  The 
size of the transaction is censored at 2 times NMS, which corresponds roughly to 
the  99.5  percentile  of the  size  distribution,  so  that  approximately  0.5%  of the 
transactions are affected. The reason for censoring is to mitigate the effect of very 
large trades on the estimates, see also Hausman et al. (1992). In the estimation, the 
dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of transaction prices, so that the 
parameter estimates can be interpreted  as relative price effects.  Overnight returns 
and opening prices are excluded from the sample. It is important to note that cross 
transactions  are  excluded from the  analysis.  These  will  be  studied  separately  in 200  F.d. Jong et al./ Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996) 193-213 
Table  1 
Estimates of the Glosten (1994) model 
Apt =  c +  RoAQt+ 1 +  RjA(Qt + i qt+ t) +  eoQt + el Qtqt + et 
c o =  R o -  e o -  elm 
c I =  R I -  l/2e 1 
R  0  R  t  c o  c~  e o  e t  ct  p 
Accor  10.21  1.50  7.31  -  1.09  2.34  5.17  0.108  -0.23 
(38.54)  (1.25)  (29.80)  (1.09)  (10.56)  (4.29) 
Elf-Aquitaine  7.73  0.50  4.90  -  1.13  2.36  3.25  0.144  -  0.21 
(49.35)  (1.11)  (33.81)  (2.80)  (18.21)  (6.69) 
BSN  8.05  1.11  6.19  -  1.38  1.67  4.89  0.040  -0.27 
(71.86)  (1.39)  (54.71)  (1.87)  (17.60)  (6.00) 
Carrefour  8.68  0.69  6.46  -  0.73  1.81  2.84  0.144  -  0.22 
(46.33)  (1.56)  (36.18)  (2.06)  (12.90)  (4.83) 
Axa-Midi  14.93  5.04  10.34  1.21  3.93  7.67  0.087  -  0.13 
(29.72)  (2.51)  (19.81)  (0.79)  (10.16)  (3.07) 
Generale des Eaux  5.79  0.65  4.09  0.33  1.42  1.95  0.144  -  0.08 
(33.46)  (1.85)  (31.33)  (1.46)  (5.90)  (4.02) 
I'Oreal  13.52  0.75  9.36  -  1.56  3.87  4.65  0.063  -  0.20 
(50.86)  (0.69)  (35.81)  (1.60)  (17.10)  (3.42) 
Ricard  15.14  0.24  10.28  -2.77  4.21  6.01  0.108  -0.23 
(27.99)  (0.09)  (20.25)  (1.48)  (9.76)  (2.07) 
Schneider  15.43  -  0.68  10.66  -  3.09  4.42  4.83  0.072  -  0.22 
(36.76)  (0.33)  (26.42)  (1.88)  (13.98)  (2.16) 
UAP  18.91  -3.44  12.34  -3.57  6.52  0.27  0.180  -0.18 
(35.26)  (2.76)  (25.11)  (3.59)  (14.51)  (0.18) 
This  table  reports  the  estimated  coefficients  of the  Glosten  (1994)  model,  Eq.  (11)  with  Ap  in 
one-hundredths of a percent, and quantities in NMS. 
The transaction size is truncated at 2 NMS; crosses are excluded from the sample. 
is estimated by the median of the transaction size distribution, divided by In 2. 
p  is the first order autocorrelation coefficient of the error term. 
Newey-West t-statistics in parenthesis. 
Section  5.  Hence,  the  results  in  this  section  (and  the  next)  concern  the  price 
dynamics  of transactions  executed  entirely  through  the  CAC  limit  order  book. 
In Table  1  the estimates  of Eq.  (1 1) are presented.  The  table  presents  estimates 
of  R i  and  e i  and the implied  values  of  ci(i =  0,1),  from  Eq.  (7).  The  coefficient  et 
is  estimated  by  the  median  of the  uncensored,  non-cross  transaction  size  distribu- 
tion,  divided  by  In  2.5  The  interpretation  of  the  coefficients  is  as  follows.  The 
bid-ask  spread  for a  transaction  of size  q  is twice  R 0 +  R 1  q.  In the Glosten  model, 
as given  by Eq.  (7),  the order  processing  cost is equal  toc  o +  clq.  The  remainder, 
(R o-  Co)+(R  I  -cl)  q  is  the  adverse  selection  cost.  Calculations  using  the 
s This follows from  Fz(qmed  )= 1 -- e -q'~a/a =½, where  qmed  is the median of q. 
6 Substituting the  expressions for  R o  and  R I  from  Eq.  (7),  we  find  that  the  adverse  selection 
component equals (e  0 +  ela)+  l/2elq. F.d. Jong et al./ Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996) 193-213  201 
estimated  coefficients in  Table  1 show that the order processing cost for a  small 
transaction (q =  0) accounts for 70% of the spread, whereas the remaining 30% is 
due  to  asymmetric  information.  For  a  transaction  of the  Normal  Market  Size 
(q =  1) the  order processing cost accounts for about 55%  of the  spread,  and  the 
adverse  selection  component  is  45%.  These  estimates  are  comparable  to  the 
estimates  obtained  in  other  research  using  US  data,  e.g.,  Stoll  (1989)  and 
Madhavan and Smidt (1991). 
It  is  interesting  to  see  how  the  interpretation  of the  coefficients of Eq.  (11) 
would  differ  in  the  Glosten-Harris  model,  which  presumes  that  competitive 
dealers quote a single price directly for an entire order (Glosten and Harris,  1988). 
In that model the  adverse  selection cost equals  the  price revision,  e 0 +  elq,  and 
the  order  processing  cost  equals  (R 0-  eo)+(R l -el)  q.  Compared  with  the 
interpretation  based  on  Glosten  (1994),  the  Glosten-Harris  model  attributes  a 
share  to  adverse selection that  is  greater by  1/2elq -  elet,  which is  negative if 
q <  2et,  and  positive  if  q >  2et.  Thus,  given  that  ot  is  the  mean  trade  size,  a 
decomposition along the  lines  suggested by Glosten and  Harris  would underesti- 
mate (overestimate) adverse selection costs (order processing costs) for trade sizes 
under twice the mean, and vice versa for trade sizes above twice the mean. Using 
the  estimated  coefficients in  Table  1,  the  Glosten-Harris  model  implies  adverse 
selection costs ranging from 25%  for q =  0  to 60%  for q =  1.  Hence, relative  to 
the  more  appropriate  Glosten  (1994)  model,  the  Glosten-Harris  model  gives  a 
slight underestimate of the adverse selection component for small transactions and 
an  overestimate  of the  asymmetric  information  component of about  15%  for a 
large transaction. 
To summarize the results of this section, we may conclude that the data support 
the  predictions  of Glosten's  model  for an  electronic  market  with  an  open  limit 
order book (Glosten,  1994).  The adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask 
spread ranges from 30%  for small  transactions to 45%  for large transactions.  As 
predicted by the model, the price revisions after large transactions are substantially 
bigger than the revisions after small transactions. 
4. Simultaneous analysis of prices and transactions 
The structural model of the previous section is elegant, but has some disadvan- 
tages.  First,  the  estimates  assume  that  the  model  is  correctly  specified.  For 
example,  it  is  assumed  that  all  asymmetric information  is  revealed  immediately 
after the transaction so that there is only an immediate price effect of trading and 
no lagged effects.  Second, it assumes that the pattern  of trading  is  exogenous. If 
the  trading  pattern  is  not exogenous, the  regression coefficients might be  biased 
because  some  relevant  lagged  trade  variables  are  omitted.  The  Vector  Auto 
Regressive (VAR) model introduced into the  market microstructure literature  by 
Hasbrouck,  1991a,  Hasbrouck,  1991b,  Hasbrouck,  1993  explicitly  takes  these 202  F.d. Jong et al. / Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996) 193-213 
considerations into account. In the  VAR,  the joint price  and trade  dynamics are 
modeled by the following system of equations: 
I  It  x, ]  c(L)  d(L)  ~  x,  ~e2t  ]'  ~e2t  ] 
(12) 
where  Ap,  denotes the  price change and  x,  is a  vector of explanatory variables 
and a(L) to  d(L) are polynomials in the lag operator. In our analysis, the  vector 
of explanatory variables includes the  trade  sign (Q,)  and  size  (z, =  qtQt ).  The 
current vector of explanatory variables, x t, is included in the equation for Apt,  SO 
that for identification the error terms  eft and  e2t  are supposed to be uncorrelated. 
This model allows a very general dependence of price changes and trade sign and 
7  size on the past,  without the  assumption that the pattern of trade  is exogenous. 
4.1.  Price effects of trading in the VAR model 
Although some of the coefficients of the VAR are interesting in themselves, the 
effects of shocks on future returns and other variables are more interesting for the 
purposes of this paper. In particular, we are interested in the expected value of the 
stock price r  periods after a shock, given that the system initially is in the "steady 
state":  8 
pet(r ) =E(p,+~-ytle],=  1,  e2,= 0, Apt_ l =0 ....  x,_ t =0 ....  ), 
(13a) 
pe2('r  )  =E(p,+T--ytlejt=O,  e2,= 1, Ap,_, =0 ....  x,_, =0 .... ). 
(13b) 
Sims (1980) popularized the idea of computing such price effects from the impulse 
responses of the VAR model, which can be computed by inverting the VAR to the 
following Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation: 
xt  ]  =  I~,(L)  8(L)  ~e2t]"  (14) 
To illustrate the usefulness of the VMA form, consider the equation for the price 
changes in more detail 
oc 
Ap, =  E  etket.,-k +  E  ~kez,,-k "  (15) 
k=O  k=O 
7 Such an assumption  was made by Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1988) and Stoll (1989). 
s  This  equation is for the case that x t and e2t are scalar, in the case of a multi-dimensional  trade 
vector, the impulse responses need to be calculated from a VAR model with orthogonal  innovations.  In 
our work. this is achieved by adding the current sign Qt as an explanatory  variable in the equation for 
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In  words,  the  price differences are infinite sums  of past innovations in  the price 
equation (elt) and the transaction equation (e2t). The effect of unit price and trade 
innovations  on  the  price  change  k  periods  ahead  are  measured  by  ot k  and  13 k, 
respectively. Thus,  the  coefficients of the  VMA  are exactly the  desired impulse 
responses.  The  effects  of  a  unit  shock  on  the  price  level  "t  periods  ahead  is 
measured by partial sums of the impulse responses: 
T 
pel('r )  =  ~'~ot k,  Pe2('r )  =  k[3k.  (16) 
k=0  k=0 
The  long run  effects of shocks  are easily determined  as  the  limits of the  partial 
sums as  -r --* ~: 
pe,(~)  =  ~  eta-= et(1),  Pe2(ac )  =  ~  13 k-  13(1).  (17) 
k=0  k=0 
Cochrane (1988) notes that this definition of the long run effects of innovations is 
unique and independent of any particular decomposition of the price process into 
permanent and transitory parts. 
4.2.  Decomposition  in  transitory  and permanent  components 
For  our  analysis  of  price  reactions  to  trades  the  partial  sums  of  impulse 
responses  provide  all  necessary  information.  However,  it  is  also  interesting  to 
calculate explicitly the transitory component of the stock price. Given our assump- 
tion that the prices and transactions are generated by a  bivariate VAR, the natural 
decomposition of the observed price,  Pt,  into a  random walk component,  ix,, and 
stationary  deviations  around  the  random  walk,  s t,  is  given  by  Beveridge  and 
Nelson (1981).  9 The decomposition is as follows: 
Pt  =  I.Lt +  st, 
P"t  =  I~t-i  +  )-~ctkel,+  ~f3ke2t, 
k=O  k=O 
s,  =  E  ake,,,-k +  ~  [3ke2.,_k,  (18) 
k=O  k=O 
oc  c¢ 
at  -=  E  E  13j. 
j=k+l  j=k+l 
9 Other  decompositions of the  stock  price  into  permanent  and  transitory  components are  also 
possible. However, these all lead to  vector ARMA models for the price-trade process, whereas we 
assume from the start a VAR model. Hasbrouck (1993) shows that the Beveridge-Nelson decomposi- 
tion give a lower bound for the variance of the stationary price part among all possible decompositions. 204  F.d. Jong et al. / Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996) 193-213 
This  decomposition  is  achieved  by  subtracting the  long run  price  effects  of the 
innovations, given by Eq. (17), from Eq. (15). The natural economic interpretation 
of the random walk component  i~ t  is that it is the underlying equilibrium price of 
the  stock,  in  which  all public information  is reflected. ~0  The  stationary part,  s t, 
measures  the  deviations  of the  actual  transaction  price  from  the  efficient price. 
Hasbrouck (1993) proposes to use the standard deviation of the stationary part, tr.~, 
as a  summary measure of the quality of a  security market.  Intuitively, tr  s  reflects 
how  closely  the  transaction  price  tracks  the  efficient  price  on  average.  This 
"dynamic"  measure of transaction costs can be seen as a  generalization of Roll's 
estimator (Roll,  1984).  Under  Roll's special assumptions,  tr  s  is equal  to half the 
realized bid-ask spread. 
4.3.  Econometric aspects 
In  actual empirical application of the  VAR methodology, several econometric 
points  deserve  attention.  Including the  sign  of the  transaction  in  a  simultaneous 
dynamic  model  creates  some  problems  for  estimation  and  computing  dynamic 
effects.  Because  Qt  is a  limited dependent variable that can  only take the values 
-  1 and  +  1, the first equation of the VAR cannot be a  conditional expectation of 
Qt  for  all  values  of  Apt_ i E  R  if  the  coefficients  of  Apt_ i  are  non-zero. 
However,  for  moderate  values  of  A p,_ i  the  linear  equation  may  be  a  good 
approximation of the true conditional expectation, and the bias in OLS estimates is 
probably not too serious. Using  Qt  as an explanatory variable in the equation for 
Apt  causes no  problems, because the errors of the return  equation  and  the other 
equations  of the VAR are uncorrelated, see Heckman  (1978).  Five lags ii  in  the 
VAR are sufficient given the general absence of residual serial correlation in the 
estimated equations.  Overnight returns  and  opening trades are excluded from  the 
analysis. All reported  standard  errors  are  heteroskedasticity consistent estimates. 
Following the procedure in the previous section, we exclude all  "cross"  transac- 
tions from the analysis. The dynamics of the crosses will be studied in Section 5. 
4.4.  Empirical results 
Table  2  reports  two  important quantities: the  leading coefficients of the  VAR 
and the sums of the moving average coefficients. The first provides an estimate of 
the half-spread, similar to the  R 0 and  R 1 coefficients of the Glosten model, (11). 
The  estimates  of  the  spread  for  small  and  large  trades  are  very  similar to  the 
10 Although equilibrium returns are probably correlated over longer horizons, see Conrad and Kaul 
(1989) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988), for the analysis of transactions data a good working hypothesis 
is that the efficient price changes are serially uncorrelated. 
n This follows Hasbrnuck (1991a). F.d. Jong et al./ Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996) 193-213 
Table 2 
VAR results on transaction prices 
205 
Estimated bid-ask  Permanent price  Ratio of permanent 
spread  effect  effect to spread 
Trade size:  Small  NMS  Small  NMS  Small  NMS 
Accor  10.15  12.25  4.24  14.31  42  117 
Elf-Aquitaine  7.83  8.53  3.95  11.45  50  134 
BSN  8.13  10.04  2.07  13.25  25  ! 32 
Carrefour  8.92  9.55  3.35  8.89  38  93 
Axa-Midi  15.57  21.28  5.91  21.58  38  ! 01 
Genarale des Eaux  5.58  6.84  2.34  6.78  40  99 
l'Oreal  13.77  14.44  5.34  20.64  39  143 
Ricard  15.09  15.96  6.39  15.90  42  100 
Schneider  15.53  15.72  6.92  20.32  44  129 
UAP  19.08  16.45  10.21  17.26  54  105 
Average  41  115 
This table shows some results of the VAR model (12) estimated on transaction prices, excluding all 
cross transactions. 
The "'spread" column shows the estimated realized half bid-ask spread,  in units of one-hundredth of a 
percent. 
The "permanent" column shows the estimated permanent price effect of a transaction, also in units of 
one-hundredth of a percent. 
The  "ratio" column reports the permanent price effect,  expressed as a  percentage of the estimated 
bid-ask spread. 
A  small transaction is a  hypothetical transaction of size 0,  whereas a  large transaction is of Normal 
Market Size. 
estimates  obtained using the Glosten model.  ~2  The sum of the impulse responses 
provide  an  estimate  of the  permanent  price  effect.  From  the  table  it is  clear that 
these  estimates  are  much  larger than  the  estimated  price  revisions  in  the Glosten 
model (cf. Table  1).  The average ratio of permanent price effect to the half-spread 
ranges  from  40%  for  small  trades  and  115%  for  large  trades.  These  numbers  are 
approximately, twice  as  large  as  the  estimates  of the  price  revisions  in  Table  1. 
Thus,  the  one  period  model  severely  underestimates  permanent  price  effects  of 
trading. 
In order to gauge how fast transaction prices adjust to new information, we plot 
the  full  impulse  response  function  in  Fig.  1.  This  figure  graphs  the  cumulative 
impulse  responses  of transaction  prices  to  trading,  expressed  as  a  fraction  of the 
estimated spread,  averaged over all ten series.  For small transactions, the effect of 
12 The effects of a small transaction are equal to the impulse responses of a shock in the sign. The 
price effects of large transactions were computed by adding the impulse responses of the sign and the 
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Fig.  1. Impulse responses of transaction prices. 
The solid line graphs the effect on transaction prices of a shock in the sign equation, and the dotted  line 
graphs the effect of a shock in both the sign and the size equation. 
a trade on subsequent transaction prices is virtually the same for all horizons. For 
large transactions, the price effect is slightly increasing over the 20 period horizon. 
From  this  pattern,  we  conclude  that  new  information  is  reflected  virtually 
immediately  in  the  transaction  prices.  Also,  we  can  reject  the  presence  of 
inventory control effects because there are no temporary price changes beyond the 
bid-ask spread. Moreover, at the most intuitive level, inventory control causes sign 
"reversals", i.e., negative serial correlation in the direction of trade initiation.  On 
the contrary, in our data there is strong positive serial correlation in the sign (about 
0.3).  13 
Table  3  reports  results  of  the  decomposition  of  the  transaction  price  in  a 
stationary and random walk part. The standard deviation of the stationary part of 
the  price  also gives nearly  the  same estimate of the  spread as the  leading  VAR 
coefficient. This is not very surprising given the immediate adjustment of prices to 
13 Other evidence  in the  literature  for the  inventory control effect  is at  best weak.  Madhavan  and 
Smidt (1993) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1992) estimate inventory control  models on samples of data 
from the NYSE. In particular, they test for mean reversion in the inventory levels of specialists.  Both 
papers are only able to find mean reversion in the inventory levels if they allow for speculative shifts in 
the desired inventory level.  Moreover, the estimated reversion to the desired  level  is very slow, and 
takes a  number of days. Therefore, for analyzing intra-day price effects,  inventory control is perhaps 




ty  s  o"  w  R 2  w,x 
Accor  10.31  8.11  0.42 
Elf-Aquitaine  8.31  7.12  0.48 
BSN  7.74  5.03  0.38 
Carrefour  9.23  7.14  0.32 
Axa-Midi  16.56  12.25  0.38 
Genarale des Eaux  6.25  4.94  0.40 
l'Oreal  13.53  10.55  0.38 
Ricard  15.14  11.40  0.37 
Schneider  15.22  1 ! .95  0.40 
UAP  17.69  14.63  0.47 
The  trs  column  shows  the  variance  of  the  stationary  part  of  the  transaction  price  (in  units  of 
one-hundredth of a percent). 
The try, column shows the variance of the innovations in the efficient price. 
2  The R~.x  column shows the proportion of the variance of the efficient price explained by trading. 
their new equilibrium values. Hasbrouck (1991b) proposes to use the proportion of 
the  variance in  the random walk part as  a  summary statistic  for the  informative- 
2  ness  of trades.  In Table  3,  this  proportion is  denoted by  Rw. x.  In line  with  the 
results in Hasbrouck (1991b),  we find that between 30% and 40% of the variance 
of w  t is explained by trading. The remainder is attributable to public information 
that is unrelated to the trading process. This result has to be interpreted with some 
caution. Recall that the regression error  e2,  includes the linearization error of the 
discrete sign Q,, and is therefore a combination of innovations in the trade process 
and  measurement  errors.  Hence,  the  variance  of  e2t  may  be  larger  than  the 
variance of information revealed by trading. 
4.5.  A  digression: Analysis of mid-quotes 
To compare our results  with the work of Hasbrouck (1991a),  we estimate  the 
VAR using  mid-quotes  instead  of transaction  prices.  Fig.  2  shows  the  average 
impulse responses of mid-quotes to shocks in the trading, expressed as a fraction 
of the  estimated  spread  (cf.  Fig.  1).  In contrast to the  immediate  adjustment  of 
transaction  prices,  the  mid-quotes slowly adjust  to the  new  long run  level.  This 
pattern is very similar to the pattern that Hasbrouck (1991a) reports for mid-quotes 
on  the  NYSE.  The  cause  of  the  apparent  conflict  between  the  estimates  on 
mid-quotes  and  transaction  prices  must  be  found  in  the  strong  positive  serial 
correlation  in  trade  sign and  size.  To see how serial  correlation affects the price 
effects  measures,  suppose  that  the  transaction  price  p,  is  a  markup  on  the 
mid-quote,  y, (cf. Eq. (8)): 
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Fig. 2.  Impulse responses of mid-quotes. 
The solid line graphs the effect  on  mid-quotes of a  shock in the sign equation, and the dotted  line 
graphs the effect of a shock in both the sign and the size equation. The estimation results are obtained 
from the VAR model, described in Section 4. 
In  this  simple  model,  the  impulse  response  of  Pt+T  to  Qt  will  be  a  factor 
~Cov(Qt+ x,  Qt) larger than the impulse response of y,+ ~. Apparently, the positive 
serial correlation in  Q,  exactly cancels out the slow adjustment of the mid-quotes 
to their new equilibrium value.  Because  Qt  and  Qt+~  are almost uncorrelated for 
large T, this model also explains why the estimates of the long run price effects are 
the same whether one uses mid-quotes or transaction prices.  In our data,  the first 
order autocorrelation in  Qt  is  high,  about  0.3,  and  decays  only  slowly  to  zero. 
Hasbrouck (1991a)  also reports estimates of serial correlation in the trade sign of 
the same order of magnitude. 
5.  Robust measures of price effects 
Measuring  dynamic  effects  of  trading  by  a  VAR  model  is  a  very  general 
approach,  but  nevertheless  imposes  strong restrictions on  the pattern  of impulse 
responses. Moreover,  the estimated  coefficients  are dominated by  the covariance 
structure  on  low  order  lags;  the  long  run  effects  are  essentially  determined  by 
extrapolating  the  short run pattern  of correlations. Campbell  and  Deaton  (1989) 
and Cochrane (1988) convincingly argue that small changes in the VAR specifica- F.d. Jong et al./ Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996) 193-213  209 
tion can lead to substantial changes in the estimates of long run effects. To check 
the robustness of the VAR results, we adopt a  more direct approach to estimating 
price effects.  Although this could be  achieved by  specifying a  general  non-para- 
metric regression function,  we restrict ourselves to  a  simple linear parameteriza- 
tion:  14 
pe2('r )  = E( Pt+r -  Yt ] Qt, zt) =  ~To +  ~3xlat +  ~x2 zt.  (20) 
The  coefficients  131  and  13~  measure  precisely the  price  effects  of current  trade 
sign and size. For "r -- 0, estimates of the realized bid-ask spread are obtained. 
This  measure  is  not  exactly equal  to  the  impulse responses  calculated before 
because we do not condition on past values of sign and size. This conditioning can 
be achieved by adding more lags to (20): 
P 
Pe2('r) = E( Pt+.~ -  Y, I1,) =  [3"o +  [~ Q, +  [U2 zt +  E  ['YTat-i  + ~Tzt-i ], 
i~l 
(21) 
where  1,  denotes the  information set consisting of all past and current trade sign 
and  size.  The  coefficients  can  be  estimated  by  simple  linear  regression.  To 
increase efficiency we use overlapping observation intervals if "r >  1. 
Fig.  3  graphs  the  estimated  price  effects  of trading  obtained from  regression 
model (21) with two additional lags for horizons up to 20 transactions. The figure 
shows the point estimates of 131  and  [3~ +  13~, scaled by the estimated spread, and 
averaged over all ten series. These curves correspond to the price effects of a small 
and  large  transaction,  respectively. The  patterns  are  very  close  to  the  estimates 
obtained by the VAR. 
So  far,  we  analyzed only transactions executed through  the  CAC  system. We 
excluded  all  cross  transactions,  which  are  negotiated  off-exchange.  We  now 
extend the model to allow for the effects of cross trades. As the price effects of 
crosses  are  expected  to  be  different  from  the  effects  of CAC  trades,  we  use  a 
multiplicative dummy  variable  d t  to  separate  cross  from  CAC  transactions  (d, 
equals zero if the transaction is from the CAC system, and one if it is a cross). The 
regression model then becomes 
pt+.~- y, =  [3"o+ [31(1  -dt)Qt  +  13~(1 -dt)zt  +~l~dtQ, + ~l~dtzt +~-*t+.,. 
(22) 
The  coefficients  y~  and  ~/~  provide  estimates  of  the  price  effects  of  cross 
transactions.  This  model  is  extended  by  including  two  lags  of  the  explanatory 
variables in a  way similar to (21). 
14  Several authors, e.g.,  Holthausen et  al.  (1990), Keim and  Madhavan (1994) and  Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993), report that the price response to buyer and seller initiated transactions on the US 
stock market is asymmetric. We assume linearity and hence symmetry here to facilitate comparison of 
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Fig. 3. Robust estimates of price effects of CAC transactions. 
The solid line graphs the effect on mid-quotes of a shock in the sign, and the dotted line graphs the 
effect of a shock in both sign and size. The estimation results are obtained from regression Eq. (21) 
with two lags. 
Fig. 4  reports the estimated price effects of the cross transactions. Although the 
initial  effect  (r =  0)  is  similar  to  the  spread  of  the  CAC  transactions,  the 
subsequent  price  effects  are  very  different.  The  price  effects  of  crosses  are 
essentially  zero  at  all  horizons.  Possibly  cross  transactions  are  informationless 
because  an  informed  trader  would  not  wish  to  incur  the  delays inherent  in  the 
process  of  searching  for  a  counterparty,  during  which  period  his  trading  plans 
would  be  publicized. Moreover,  counterparties would  only be  forthcoming  if he 
could convince them that he was not trading on information. 
6. Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  analyzed  the  intra-day  price  effects  of trading  on  the  Paris 
Bourse.  The  estimates of the  Glosten (1994)  model  imply that  adverse selection 
costs account for 30-45%  of the bid-ask spread, and order processing cost for the 
remainder.  Special  attention  was  paid  to  separating  temporary  from  permanent 
price effects.  One  remarkable result of the  analysis is the difference in estimates 
obtained  from  structural  models  and  from  an  impulse  response  analysis.  More 
specifically, the Glosten (1994)  model estimates price revisions of between  25% 
and 60%  of the bid-ask spread for small and  large transactions, respectively. The 
estimates of permanent  price effects based on  a  VAR model and  robust impulse F.d. Jong et al. /  Journal of Empirical Finance 3 (1996) 193-213  211 
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Fig. 4. Robust estimates of price effects of cross transactions. 
The solid line graphs the effect on mid-quotes of a shock in the sign, and the dotted line graphs the 
effect of a shock in both sign and size. The estimation results are obtained from regression Eq. (22) 
with two lags. 
response estimates are twice as large, ranging from 40% up to 115% of the bid-ask 
spread. Thus,  the empirical results broadly confirm the predictions of the Glosten 
(1994)  model  for  an  electronic  order driven  market,  but  a  one  period empirical 
implementation of that model underestimates the price effects of trading. 
The price effects of cross transactions are very different from the price effects 
of  CAC  transactions.  Although  the  realized  bid-ask  spreads  are  similar  to  the 
spread  for CAC  transactions,  the  permanent  price  impact  of crosses  is  virtually 
zero. The explanation must be that the off-exchange trading is not anonymous, and 
that asymmetric information plays less of a role in that market. The CAC system is 
anonymous  and  therefore  potentially prone  to  adverse  selection  problems.  This 
might explain why the CAC system seems to specialize as a retail market for small 
transactions, and large transactions are either crosses or are executed on London's 
SEAQ International. 
7. For further reading 
Easley  and  O'Hara  (1987),  George  et  al.  (1991),  and  Glosten  and  Milgrom 
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